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Pricing Lives for Corporate Risk
Decisions
W. Kip Viscusi*
The 2014 GM ignition-switch recall highlighted the inadequaciesof the
company's safety culture and the shortcomings of regulatory sanctions. The
company's inattentionto systematic thinking about product safety can be traced
to the hostile treatment of corporate risk analyses by the courts. This Article
proposes that companies should place a greater value on lives at risk than they
have in previous risk analyses and that they should receive legalprotections for
product risk analyses. Companies' valuations of fatality risks and regulatory
penalties have priced lives too low. The guidance provided by the value of a
statistical life, which is currently $9.1 million for transportation policies,
establishes an appropriateprice for lives from the standpointof corporatesafety
decisions, regulatorysanctions, and punitive damages. The valuation of defectrelated deaths may, however, be even greater than that of preventing fatalities
through safety improvements; accordingly, the value of a statistical life may
establish a floor, rather than a ceiling, for the appropriatepenalties for safetyrelateddefects.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2014, General Motors ("GM") incurred government fines of
$35 million for failing to report the safety problems stemming from
defective ignition switches in several lines of vehicles.' The U.S.
Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety
1.
Consent Order, In re TQ14-001, NHTSA Recall No. 14V-047, at 4 (Nat'1 Highway Traffic
Safety Admin. May 16, 2014), available at www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/communications/pdflMay-162014-TQ14-001-Consent-Order.pdf; see also Jeff Plungis & Tim Higgins, GM to Pay Record $35M
Fine over Ignition-Switch Recall, 42 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 534 (May 19, 2014).
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Administration ("NHTSA") levied the maximum penalty for failing to
report the defect, which caused thirteen documented fatalities. 2
Subsequently, GM launched a series of automobile recalls for defective
ignition switches and other vehicle defects; at the time of this writing,
the recalls total twenty-nine million vehicles. 3 This incident highlights
a wide range of fundamental problems plaguing corporate risk decisions
generally, as well as the failures of tort liability and government
regulation to rectify these problems.
From an economic efficiency standpoint, a company's product
risk objective should provide a level of product safety that is consistent
with the level of safety consumers would choose if they were fully
cognizant of the product's risk characteristics. Ascertaining which
safety attributes are desirable and which features are not worthwhile
should not be an entirely haphazard process. What procedure should
companies adopt in making this product safety decision? A principal
theme of this Article is that companies should confront the pertinent
tradeoffs directly and think systematically about product safety;
striking a responsible balance between safety and other competing
concerns such as cost should be a fundamental component of corporate
operations.
Indeed, the detailed NHTSA assessment of GM's practices and
the investigative report GM commissioned to examine the ignitionswitch recall fail to indicate any systematic economic assessment by
GM of safety-related issues.4 Similar to how a dog's failure to bark
became the critical clue in a Sherlock Holmes murder mystery,5 the
glaring missing element in the 315-page GM investigative report on the
ignition-switch failure is that there is no mention of any safety-related
studies pertaining to the ignition switch or any other aspect of vehicle
safety. Instead, there is overwhelming evidence that GM's corporate
culture officially discouraged any frank discussion of safety.6 Even
suggesting that there might be a product defect that posed liability
concerns was off limits. 7
2.

Id. The GM documentation of "more than a dozen" fatalities is discussed in ANTON R.

VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION

SWITCH RECALLS 1 (May 29, 2014).
3.
Jeff Bennett, GM to Recall 8.45 Million More Vehicles in North America, WALL ST. J.
(June 30, 2014, 3:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/gm-to-recall-7-6-million-more-vehicles-in-us-1404153705, archived at http://perma.cclF6Z2-L3TS.
4.
See Consent Order, supra note 1, at 9; VALUKAS, supra note 2.
5.

1 ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE,

Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, THE

COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 359 (Race Point Publishing 2013) (1894).
The GM corporate safety culture is discussed in VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 252-58.
6.
7.
One of the words GM officials were told to avoid was "defect." See Consent Order, supra
note 1, Exhibit B at 41.
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The company's treatment of safety matters might strike outside
observers as bizarre. Company officials in safety-related meetings
engaged in what became known as the "GM salute" in which they folded
their arms and pointed their fingers towards others and away from
themselves, shirking any personal responsibility for taking subsequent
action on the matters being discussed. 8 Another ingrained corporate
practice known as the "GM nod" involved officials at safety meetings
nodding that taking action was appropriate, with all participants
realizing that this was an empty gesture as there would be no follow
through.9 These behaviors are far removed from any semblance of a
diligent effort to assess and implement product safety decisions.
The emergence of GM's lax safety culture was not a historical
accident. In this Article, I argue that the company's systematic neglect
of safety is not an institutional quirk but rather was likely a response
to past treatment of corporate risk analyses in tort cases. In the 1970s
and 1980s, as discussed in Parts III and IV, all the major U.S.
automobile companies undertook detailed economic analyses of the
costs and risk implications of safety-related product characteristics.
However, the cases analyzed below indicate that frank assessments of
the risks and costs of different design possibilities led these companies
to be vilified in the press and penalized by juries for undertaking such
safety studies, not simply for specific alleged deficiencies in the
analyses. A particularly controversial component of the analysis was
the use of tort damages amounts to value the lives lost by failing to
adopt additional safety measures. This approach led to an economic
value of life that appeared to be offensively low to jurors and also was
not consistent with a sound economics approach. These adverse
experiences no doubt have contributed to the corporate abandonment of
systematic assessments of safety decisions. If there were legal reforms
to give companies protections for corporate risk analyses, it would be
more feasible for companies to depart from a passive safety culture.
This Article proposes such potential remedies to promote more explicit
engagement with the merits of product risk decisions.
The linchpin of all these interrelated issues-both from the
standpoint of the regulatory agency and corporations-is the price that
is attached to risks to life. In particular, what level of higher costs is
worthwhile to incur for each expected fatality that will be prevented?
This monetary tradeoff between product costs and fatality rates is

8.
9.

See VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 68, 255.
Id. at 2, 256.

2015]1

PRICING LIVES

1121

known as the value of a statistical life. 10 Measures of the value of a
statistical life play a fundamental role in several dimensions of
corporate risk policies. This monetary value enables companies to
properly monetize the expected lives that will be saved from additional
safety improvements. It also serves as the reference point used by
NHTSA and other government agencies in setting regulatory
standards."

Additionally, where the value of a statistical life should play a
role, but currently does not, is with respect to setting penalty levels for
violations of safety regulations, such as GM's failure to report the
ignition-switch defect. Should companies' risk assessment efforts fall
short, government regulations and sanctions can come into play.
However, regulatory sanctions are often limited and do not contain
sufficiently severe financial penalties to deter corporations from failing
to provide adequate levels of safety. As a result, regulatory agencies
provide insufficient impetus to lead companies to engage with safetyrelated issues in a thorough and responsible manner. Applying the
value of a statistical life to regulatory sanctions would consequently
dramatically increase the level of these penalties.
Furthermore, the value of a statistical life could exert a
restraining function in the context of punitive damages awards,
providing a methodology for establishing appropriate levels of
deterrence. Punitive damages awards meeting the $100 million cutoff
have been termed "blockbuster punitive damages awards."12 Juries
sometimes levy these awards in auto-safety cases, even when there is
no sound basis for awards of these magnitudes." Jurors are usually
able agree on what behavior is reprehensible, but mapping these
concerns into a dollar-penalty figure often proves to be problematic. 14
In addition to not having an understanding of how to calculate punitive
10. W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a StatisticalLife: A CriticalReview of
Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, 5 (2003).
11. W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Individual and Societal Risks to Life and Health, in 1
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 435 tbls.7.2, 7.3 (Mark Machina & W. Kip

Viscusi eds., 2014).
12. The following articles utilize the "blockbuster award" terminology to refer to punitive
damages awards of $100 million or more and document the awards: Alison F. Del Rossi & W. Kip
Viscusi, The ChangingLandscape of Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 12 Am. L. & ECON.
REV. 116, 116 (2010); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries
Perform, 33 J. OF LEGAL STUD., 1, 2 (2004); W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages
Awards, 53 EMORY L.J. 1405, 1408 (2004); and W. Kip Viscusi & Benjamin J. McMichael, Shifting
the Fat-TailedDistributionof Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD.
350, 350 (2014).
13. See sources cited supra note 12.
14. Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage, Erratic
Awards, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 31 (2002).
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damages, jurors also may lack an appreciation of the constructive role
that benefit-cost analysis can play in promoting product safety. The
identified loss because of a failure to adopt some additional safety
measures will loom larger than the components of an economic analysis
that addresses prospective benefits and costs. This Article provides the
requisite framework for using punitive damages as an incentive
structure.
In all of these domains, the value of a statistical life should play
a pivotal role. Surprisingly, there is no evidence that the value of a
statistical life played any role either in setting government sanctions
for vehicle-related regulatory violations-even though its function in
setting regulatory standards is well established-or in driving
corporate risk decisions. Overhauling the institutional approaches to
corporate safety will require a commitment to deterrence-based
analyses and sanctions. Reform will also require additional legal
protections so that when corporations do undertake systematic
analyses of safety measures they will not be vulnerable to punitive
damages awards simply because they have undertaken a thorough
examination of the safety-related issues.
II. GUIDELINES FOR PRODUCT RISK ANALYSES
The starting point for the evaluation of corporate risk decisions
is the value that companies and government agencies should place on
reduced mortality risks. This Part describes this economic value, which
is known as the value of a statistical life. Estimates of this value are
based on a large body of empirical evidence, principally relating to how
workers value risks to their lives. The nature of GM's ignition-switch
decision was far removed from a systematic economic assessment that
balanced the costs and risks of a defective switch. Part III explores the
GM practices that led to the failure to correct the defect and suggests a
more responsible corporate safety policy. Systematic assessment of the
costs and safety decisions had formerly been an integral part of
company safety policies, as indicated by the experiences at Ford,
Chrysler, and GM that are described in Part IV. However, these
evaluations fell short in terms of their economic approach and also led
companies to be punished with very high punitive damages awards,
sometimes with awards in excess of $100 million. Unfortunately, the
experimental evidence from mock jurors reviewed in Part V suggests
that sound analysis alone will not provide companies undertaking
sound risk analyses with a shield from unwarranted punitive damages
awards. Thus, some form of legal protection for such analyses is needed.
The approach of utilizing the value of a statistical life in safety practices
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also can serve as the basis for revamping government sanctions for
safety violations, as articulated in Part VI, and for setting punitive
damages levels, as observed in Part VII. Part VIII offers general
conclusions regarding a general restructuring of societal product safety
policies.
How companies and government agencies should approach
product safety and product risk regulation decisions should be similar.
In each case, there should be an effort to strike an appropriate balance
between the cost of additional safety and the value to consumers of the
safety improvements. This tradeoff is known as the value of a statistical
life. What these values mean, where these values come from, and how
they should be incorporated in corporate decisions and risk policies is
the subject of this Part.
A. PricingRisks to Life
Before examining the GM ignition-switch problem, it is useful to
explore the context for auto-safety decisions and the essential role of
the value of a statistical life ("VSL") in corporate risk analyses. Autosafety decisions fit the standard paradigm for how one should use VSL
estimates in setting the appropriate level of safety: there are welldefined categories of product costs as well as anticipated benefits from
additional safety-related product characteristics. Auto-safety decisions
inquire whether there should be a limit to the safety features
incorporated in the design of the vehicle or whether cars should be made
as safe as possible. If all cars were designed to be as safe as tanks, there
would be fewer auto-related injuries and deaths. But doing so imposes
a cost in terms of higher vehicle prices, lower fuel efficiency, and
adverse environmental consequences. The safety design task is to strike
an appropriate balance between risk and cost, recognizing that at some
point the value of the added safety to the consumer will not be worth
the additional expense or loss of vehicle performance.
The intuitive appeal of thinking about vehicle cost and safety
tradeoffs plays such a fundamental role in our general understanding
of risk-cost tradeoffs that U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer
uses auto safety as an example to illustrate the unacceptability of
unbounded commitments to reducing risk. 15 Justice Breyer asks
whether it is worthwhile to promulgate a regulation that will save ten
lives annually over forty years at a cost of $100 billion, which is not an
entirely hypothetical regulatory problem. He repositions this question

15.

STEPHEN

BREYER,

REGULATION 13-14 (1993).

BREAKING

THE

VIcIoUS

CIRCLE:

TOWARD

EFFECTIVE RISK
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as being equivalent in risk-cost terms to asking how much a person
would be willing to pay for a slightly safer car that would reduce the
death risk by five percent:
Would we pay an extra $1,000 for such a car? An extra $5,000 for that added contribution
to safety? To spend $100 billion as a nation to save ten lives annually assumes we value
safety so much that each of us would pay $48,077 extra for any such new, slightly safer
car. 16

It is likely that few consumers would find it worthwhile to pay such a
price premium.
B. Measuring the Value of a Statistical Life
In practice, we need not repeat this thought experiment for every
auto-safety device considered. The tradeoff that people are willing to
make between risk and cost is embodied in the VSL estimates. The U.S.
Department of Transportation uses VSL estimates to decide whether it
is worthwhile to impose motor-vehicle safety regulations, such as tire
pressure monitoring systems, roof crush resistance standards, and
limits on hours of service of truck drivers.17 The agency sets regulations
after undertaking detailed regulatory impact analyses of the costs and
benefits of standards with varying levels of stringency. Using a VSL of
$9.1 million, the U.S. Department of Transportation assesses the value
of reductions in fatality rates for transportation policies. The agency
draws this $9.1 million figure from recent labor market estimates of
workers' risk-money tradeoffs.1 8 The agency uses the underlying labor
market estimates to analyze the wage premium that workers receive
for fatality risks, controlling for other aspects of the worker and the job.
Thus, if a worker receives $910 for an annual job-related fatality rate
of 1/10,000, then collectively a group of 10,000 workers would receive
$9.1 million to compensate them for the one expected death in their
group. This $9.1 million figure is the VSL in this example.
Thus, the VSL is the value placed on lives from the standpoint
of reducing the probability of an expected death. In contrast, court
awards of compensatory damages are intended primarily to serve an
insurance role for the losses that the family has suffered because of the

16.
17.
VSL.

Id.
See Viscusi, supra note 11, at 436 tbl.7.2 for examples of NHTSA regulations using the

18.
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REVISED DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE 2013: TREATMENT OF THE
VALUE OF PREVENTING FATALITIES AND INJURIES IN PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES (2013),

availableat http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/R245-MQFK.
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death.19 Put somewhat differently, the VSL is primarily an ex ante
deterrence value in that it establishes the price per expected life for
reducing the risk of death, whereas compensatory damages serve as an
ex post insurance role. The magnitude of the VSL estimates is about an
order of magnitude greater than the value of the worker's lost earnings,
which generally comprises a principal part of the value of compensatory
damages.2 0 Using court awards as the reference point for pricing lives
consequently undervalues the importance of reducing product risks.
Regulatory agencies use the VSL to guide their setting of
regulatory safety standards. The U.S. Department of Transportation
has long been a leader among regulatory agencies in basing its
regulations on a balance between cost and risk. There might be many
reasons why agencies such as the U.S. Department of Transportation
follow this approach, not the least of which is that the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget requires regulatory agencies to assess the
costs and benefits of all major regulations. 21 In addition, because the
costs of motor-vehicle safety and airplane safety are shifted to
consumers in terms of higher prices for cars and airplane tickets in a
competitive market, 22 the costs are more salient than costs spread
throughout the economy. Most of the costs of transportation regulations
are directly borne by the people who benefit from the safety
improvements generated by the regulations. 23
In much the same way that government agencies assess the
desirability of prospective safety regulations in terms of their benefits
and costs, ideally private firms should undertake similar assessments
for potential vehicle design changes. Use of the VSL to value these
benefits would establish the appropriate price for safety that consumers
would be willing to pay if they understood the benefits that the safer
car offered. Thus, there is a direct market linkage between safety
19. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensation for
Wrongful Death and PersonalInjury, 20 J. FORENSIC ECON. 113, 118-19 (2007).
20. For a large set of U.S. studies, the average VSL is $14 million for workers with average
earnings of $43,767, which is smaller than the VSL by a factor of 320. W. Kip Viscusi, The Role of
Publication Selection Bias in Estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life, 1 AM. J. HEALTH ECON.
27, 32 (2015). Ignoring the role of discounting lifetime income in determining present value, this
average VSL exceeds lifetime earnings by a factor of ten for workers who work for thirty-two years
and a factor of eight if workers have forty years of earnings.
21. President Clinton's Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), amended the approach
under President Reagan's Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), and continues to establish
the principal guidance for regulatory oversight.
22. Safety measures that raise marginal costs will raise prices since price equals marginal
cost in competitive markets. W. KIP VISCuSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 81 (4th ed. 2005).
23.

29 (1992).

W. KIP ViscusI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 28-
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improvements and consumers, as making cars safer will raise the cost
of vehicle production and consequently vehicle price. But making these
safety improvements also boosts how much consumers are willing to
pay for the safer vehicles. 24 For that reason, the costs of government
regulations of auto safety that pass a benefit-cost test, as the NHTSA
safety standards generally do, should not be viewed as a deadweight
societal loss but as providing consumers with a better, highly valued
product that average consumers would choose if they understood the
risk reduction benefits.
III. THE 2014 GM FAULTY IGNITION SWITCH
While a systematic thinking about costs and risks is the desired
product safety framework, how GM set about dealing with the ignitionswitch design issues was quite different. As this Part will demonstrate,
GM became aware of the ignition-switch defect, but the organizational
procedures for dealing with such safety issues fell short due to a wellestablished lax corporate safety culture. Application of a responsible
economic balancing of risks and costs indicates the desirability of the
ignition-switch recall that the company had failed to undertake.
A. The Ignition-Switch Defect and Recall Costs
It is instructive to examine what role, if any, that a balancing of
benefits and costs of safety played in one of the most prominent product
safety problems in this century-GM's faulty ignition switch. 25 There is
no publicly available, detailed description of whatever analysis GM did
of the defective ignition-switch recall. The two main components of an
analysis of a product defect are the nature of the risk and the cost to
eliminate it.26 There is substantial information about GM's assessment
of the nature of the defect: the switch could move from the "run" position
to the "off' position, resulting in both a loss of power and possibly
leading to the airbags not deploying in the event of a crash. 27 However,
24. The positive relationship between vehicle safety and automobile prices is documented in
Mark K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valuations of
Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J.L. & ECON. 79, 79-106 (1995).
25. The other auto-safety problem of comparable scale is the unintended acceleration of
Toyota vehicles. The extent to which this phenomenon is due to driver error or a defect in the cars'
computer system was widely debated. In 2014, Toyota reached a $1.2 billion settlement with the
U.S. Department of Justice. See Charles Levinson, Jeff Bennett & Devlin Barrett, Toyota to Pay
$1.2 Billion to Settle U.S. Probe, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2014, 7:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702304256404579449070848399280.
26.

W. Kip VIscusI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 62 (1991).

27.

Consent Order, supra note 1, at 2.

2015]

PRICING LIVES

1127

there is not substantial information about the full extent of the adverse
health impacts that have resulted from the defect.
GM attributed thirteen deaths to the ignition-switch problems
first linked to the Chevrolet Cobalt.28 However, the Acting
Administrator of NHTSA, David Friedman, believed that the death toll
could be greater than the number of deaths GM has blamed on the
defect, and the extent of the human toll in terms of nonfatal injuries
and possible disabilities is not fully known. 29 Given that the overall
death rate for drivers of the Chevrolet Cobalt is the highest of all
vehicles in its class, 30 Friedman's fear that the risk might exceed the
thirteen fatalities estimated by GM may be well founded. The
possibility of additional human costs from the defect is also bolstered
by the fact that GM has identified at least fifty-four frontal-impact
crashes involving ignition-switch problems that led the airbag to not
deploy. 3 1 GM also has not made public any information regarding its
risk and cost assessment other than the statement by its current CEO,
Mary Barra, who testified that as of 2007 GM estimated that the cost
of a recall for vehicles with the faulty ignition switch would be
$100 million. 32 Since the recall did not begin until 2014, GM
concluded-at least implicitly-that the recall was not merited given
this cost level.
The 2007 recall analysis date and the $100 million cost given by
Barra provide my principal reference points for assessing GM's recall
analysis decision. One could also examine other cost assessments at
different points in time, but the analysis identified by Barra appears to
be the most comprehensive. Subsequent news reports indicated other
dates and different cost assessments for problems related to the ignition
switch. For example, in 2005, a GM engineering manager emailed other
engineers and design team members that it would cost ninety cents per
28. VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 1-5. The affected vehicles were part of GM's small car product
line designed to meet federal emission requirements and to be inexpensive, "cost conscious"
vehicles. Id. at 17, 22.
29. Mike Ramsey & Jeff Bennett, GM Toll Likely to Rise, WALL ST. J., May, 28, 2014, at B2.
30. VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 21.
31. Id. at 1. There also have been more than one hundred claims for fatalities linked to the
ignition switch. GM Fund Receives 107Death Claims Blaming Faulty Switches, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
26, 2014, 10:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/gm-fund-receives-107-death-claims-blaimingfaulty-ignition-switches-1409 105410.
32. GM CEO Mary Barra reported this estimate in testimony before the U.S. Congress on
April 1, 2014. See Tom Krisher & Marcy Gordon, New CEO BarraFaces Tough Task in Shedding
Old GM, Yahoo! (Apr. 2, 2014, 7:13 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/ceo-barra-faces-tough-taskshedding-old-gm-040907777.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BX7M-BFJN. The recall cost in
2014 has turned out to be much greater. See GM Total Recall Cost: $4.1 Billion, CNN.COM (Feb.
4, 2015, 1:07 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/04/news/companies/gm-earnings-recall-costs/,
archived at http://perma.ccl6WRH-DZXQ.
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vehicle, plus $400,000 for production machinery, to change the switch. 33
Additionally, retrospective cost estimates for ignition-switch recalls
reached as high as $700 million in 2014, but this figure includes model
years not included in the 2007 analysis.

34

All of these cost assessments

mention the cost associated with the recall but do not estimate the risk
in terms of the expected number of lives that would be lost or the
monetary value that should be placed on these lives.
Based on Mary Barra's testimony regarding the 2007 analysis 35
and the information in the NHTSA Consent Order's summary of the
ignition-switch problem, 36 for at least the seven-year period between
2007 and 2014, the company was aware of the risk, undertook a cost
analysis, concluded that a recall was not worth the cost, and failed to
notify either consumers or the government of the problem. 37 By law, the
company was required to notify NHTSA of any safety-related defects
within five days after a defect has been determined to be safety
related. 38 However, it was only on February 7, 2014, or seven years after
the 2007 GM cost analysis of a recall, 39 that GM notified NHTSA that
there was a safety defect in 619,122 Chevrolet Cobalt vehicles and
model year 2007 Pontiac G5 vehicles. 40 Later that month, GM added an
additional 748,024 vehicles with that defect, including model year
2006-2007 Chevrolet HHR and Pontiac Solstice, model year 2003-2007
Saturn lon, and model year 2007 Saturn Sky vehicles. 41 The following
month, GM added another 823,788 vehicles that may have received
faulty service parts during repairs to the list.42 These vehicles included
model year 2008-2011 Chevrolet HHR and model year 2008-2010
Chevrolet Cobalt, Pontiac Solstice, Pontiac G5, and Saturn Sky
vehicles. 43 The GM recalls in 2014 for this defect and recalls for other
33. Jeff Bennett, GM Report to Address Missteps, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2014, at BI & B7. The
article also details meetings in 2007 in which NHTSA officials raised issues pertaining to fatal
crashes involving the ignition switch.
34. Id.
35.
See Krishner & Gordon, supra note 32.
36.

H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, STAFF REPORT ON THE GM IGNITION SWITCH

RECALL: REVIEW OF NHTSA 1 (2014).
37.
NHTSA Acting Administrator David Friedman used language similar to that in the risk
analysis court cases: "GM engineers knew about the defect. GM investigators knew about the
defect. GM lawyers knew about the defect. But GM did not act to protect Americans from that
defect." Bennett, supra note 33, at B7.
For documentation of this and all subsequent statements regarding GM's contacts with
38.
NHTSA, see Consent Order, supra note 1.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2-3.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id.
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vehicle defects that were apparently stimulated by the ignition-switch
recall total an astounding twenty-nine million vehicles as of mid-2014. 44
B. The Failed GM CorporateSafety Culture
Although it is not known whether GM did a full blown benefitcost analysis or just a cost analysis in 2007, GM nevertheless developed
corporate practices that reflect the company's desire to suppress any
critical comments by the staff relating to product safety. A confidential
GM memo included as an exhibit to the NHTSA Consent Order
admonished the staff to avoid controversial "judgment words." The
memo explained that "[d]ocuments used for reports and presentations
should contain only engineering results, facts, and judgments. These
documents should not contain speculations, opinions, vague
nondescriptive words, or words with emotional connotations." 45 Among
the examples of forbidden words provided in the memo were seemingly
accurate characterizations of potentially recallable cars, including
asphyxiating, bad, critical, dangerous, defect, defective, failure,
maiming, potentially disfiguring, problem, safety, safety-related,
serious, and unstable. 46 In addition, the memo admonished against
using more colorful and possibly inflammatory language, including
apocalyptic, big time, cataclysmic, catastrophic, Corvair-like,
deathtrap, decapitating, detonate, evil, ghastly, inferno, powder keg,
suicidal, terrifying, Titanic, tomblike, and you're toast. 4 7 With even
seemingly innocuous words such as "safety" and "defect" being ruled out
of bounds, GM in effect discouraged frank discussion of product risks.
Another GM memo also apparently sought to head off litigation
threats by providing guidance for how company drivers of GM vehicles
should discuss problems that they encountered while driving the
vehicle. The confidential GM memo "What every company vehicle
driver must know. . ." apparently sought to rein in potentially

damaging characterizations of safety problems. 48 The memo listed the
following "[e]xamples of comments that do not help identify and solve
problems:
.

* 'This is a lawsuit waiting to happen.
* 'Unbelievable Engineering screw up. ..

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Bennett, supra note 3.
Consent Order, supra note 1, Exhibit B, at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39.
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* 'This is a safety and security issue. . .'
* 'This a very dangerous thing to happen. My family refuses to ride
in the vehicle now . .'

.

* 'I believe the wheels are too soft and weak and could cause a
serious problem.
* 'Dangerous .. . almost caused accident.' "'49
Instead, the company encouraged comments that downplayed
the potential safety implications and opted for blander descriptions of
the problems. Perhaps because of such suppression of safety-related
concerns, GM officials categorized the ignition-switch problem as a
matter of "convenience" rather than safety.5 0
Other aspects of the GM corporate culture embody a similar
inattention to safety. CEO Mary Barra described what she referred to
as the "GM nod," in which participants in a meeting signal that there
should be action taken but do not intend to actually implement the
plan. 5 1 The investigation commissioned by GM to examine the ignitionswitch failure identified the GM nod as a common commitment to
inaction at safety committee meetings. 52 Another noteworthy GM
behavior became known as the "GM salute." Participants in the meeting
fold their arms and point in each direction, away from themselves, to
indicate that they have no responsibility for taking action, as all
responsibility lies with others. 53 The investigation of the GM ignitionswitch recall indicated that the shift of responsibility epitomized by this
salute was an ingrained aspect of the GM safety culture "that
permeated the Cobalt investigation for years." 5 4

As evidenced by the suppression of frank safety discussions and
the behaviors designed to deflect personal responsibility for safety
matters, GM had apparently developed a bunker mentality in which
honest efforts to confront safety issues and take action were
discouraged. As this Article will demonstrate, GM had a history of
undertaking systematic risk and cost analyses of safety-related
matters, but these analyses were used against it in litigation. A
reasonable hypothesis is that the fear of substantial legal sanctions
played a key role in the development of the lax corporate safety culture
at GM. While the causal link between litigation fears and the current

49.

Id.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 70.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 255.
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GM safety culture is not known, there is clearly a litigation-related
overtone to the avoidance of controversial safety-related language.
Moreover, as one would expect, GM was aware of the potential for legal
liability. Beginning in 2010, GM was aware of the potential for punitive
damages during the discussion of the ignition-switch defect.5 5 Although
GM remains vulnerable to litigation with respect to the ignition-switch
defect and has established a victim compensation fund from which the
injured can recoup scheduled compensation amounts for ignitionrelated injuries, 56 GM's legal liability would be even greater if it were
not for some of the legal protections that may be afforded by its Chapter
11 bankruptcy reorganization in 2009.57

C. A Sounder Approach to the Ignition-Switch Defect
GM has apparently shunted safety issues to the side, but what
would have been the implications of a sound benefit-cost analysis of the
ignition-switch defect? Did GM take the economically justified action by
failing to address the defect? Making this assessment by relying on our
current knowledge of the extent of the risk takes advantage of hindsight
because the internal assessments by the company are not available.
However, a benefit-cost analysis drawing on the information that has
become public indicates that a recall would have been worthwhile. Even
using GM's estimate of thirteen defect-related deaths and the U.S.
Department of Transportation's VSL figure of $9.1 million, the value of
the expected lives that would be saved by preventing the ignitionrelated deaths would be $118 million (i.e., thirteen lives x $9.1 million
per life). 58 This amount alone exceeds the $100 million estimated cost
of the recall. The appropriate benefit amount surely would have been
higher if all fatalities, injuries, and property damage linked to the
defect were included.
This calculation treats the valuation of a product defect in which
customers are experiencing an increase in risk as being the same as the

55.

Id. at 140.

56.

See

GM

IGNITION

COMPENSATION

CLAIMS

RESOLUTION

FACILITY,

http://

www.gmignitioncompensation.com (Nov. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EG6L-FFCU.
57. Ashby Jones, GM Says It Has a Shield from Some Liability, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2014,
7:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/gm-says-it-has-a-shield-from-some-liability-1402874861.
58. The number of valid death claims ultimately found to be related to the ignition-switch
defect is much higher. As of January 26, 2015, the administrator of the GM settlements, Kenneth
Feinberg, had certified fifty valid claims. See Linda Sandler, GM's Confirmed Ignition Deaths Hit
2015),
http://
(Jan.
26,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
50 as
Claims Deadline Nears,
www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-26/gm-s-confirmed-ignition-deaths-hit-50-as-claims-deadlinenears.html, archived at http://perma.ccN78D-FX3U. With fifty deaths, the benefit value of
repairing the ignition switches would be $455 million.
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value of a safety device that leads to a risk reduction. If there is a
discrepancy between the valuation of defects and safety improvements,
as will be discussed below, the appropriate value per fatality prevented
may exceed $9.1 million. 59 The benefits of addressing the defect
consequently may be greater than is suggested by a calculation based
on the value of safety improvements.
Given that GM did not report the product defect to NHTSA as
required by law, what regulatory sanction is warranted? For simplicity,
assume that an expected increase in the fatality rate from a defect has
the same value as an expected decrease in the fatality rate by a safety
improvement. To determine the level of regulatory penalties needed to
provide adequate incentives for safety, the VSL provides the
appropriate guidance. To convey the value of the lives that are lost by
failing to report a defect, NHTSA should impose a penalty of $9.1
million per expected death. 60 However, the regulatory sanction needed
to provide an appropriate incentive for efficient control of risks-$9.1
million per expected death-greatly exceeds the penalty caps NHTSA
is permitted to levy, which is only $7,000 per violation with a limit of
$35 million for a related series of violations.6 1 Moreover, any single
violation could have resulted in a fatality, and a related series of
violations could have led to a much greater number of fatalities than in
the defective ignition-switch situation. Thus, the failure of the National
Motor Vehicle Safety Act to establish any meaningful linkage between
the violations, the extent of the harm, and the expected economic value
of the prevented risks impedes the role of these sanctions to function as
a safety incentive mechanism.
An appropriately set sanction would have dwarfed the current
penalty amount. Suppose that there are only thirteen deaths related to
the defect and that the VSL for product defects is the same as for safety
improvements. Then, consistent with the benefit-cost analysis
summarized above, the appropriate sanction for a readily identifiable
risk would have been $118 million rather than $35 million. 62

59. Part VI infra reviews how the valuation of defects may exceed the value of safety
improvements.
60. This deterrence value assumes that NHTSA can identify all lives lost by a company's
failure to report the defect. If there is a probability above zero that the company will be able to
conceal its behavior, the appropriate penalty will be greater, as discussed below in the context of
punitive damages.
61. Consent Order, supra note 1, at 2.
62. As discussed below, if the behavior is hidden and may not be readily monitored by the
regulator, the efficient penalty level is greater.
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IV. RISK ANALYSES AT FORD, CHRYSLER, AND GM: THE FORD PINTO
DEBACLE AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES

The potential hazards of undertaking a corporate risk analysis
are exemplified by the experiences of Ford, Chrysler, and GM. The first
such analysis to receive scrutiny was Ford's assessment of gas tank
location risks for the Ford Pinto. Although gas tank location issues often
played a prominent role because of the fire-related hazards, there were
similar analyses of various safety measures for Ford, Chrysler, and GM.
In each case, the company undertook an analysis seeking to ascertain
the appropriate balance between cost and safety improvements and
ultimately decided not to adopt the additional safety measures. The
companies' analyses were flawed in serious ways, with the most
important being that lives were valued based on the level of tort
damages in wrongful death cases. In addition to this specific
shortcoming in the economic methodology, there appears to be an
overriding problem that such analyses appear to generate substantial
controversy and, in some cases, very large punitive damages awards.
A. The Adverse Repercussions of the FordPinto Risk Analysis
The first product risk analysis to garner national attention
involved the Ford Pinto, which, much like the GM cars implicated in
the ignition recall problems, was an entry-level vehicle. 63 The Ford
Pinto case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 6 4 also involved the first
documented blockbuster punitive damages award. 65 The injury
occurred in 1972 when a Ford Pinto was rear ended after it stopped on
the freeway. 66 The thirteen-year-old passenger, Richard Grimshaw,
suffered a serious injury and the driver was killed. 67 The impact caused
a fire that the plaintiffs attributed to a defective product design for the
fuel filler pipe and the placement of the gas tank behind the rear axle. 68
In addition to a compensatory damages award of $2.5 million to
Grimshaw and $600,000 to the driver, the jury awarded $125 million in

63. VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 17 and 22, describe the cars affected by the ignition-switch
recall as small, fuel efficient, "cost conscious" vehicles that were produced on "slim margins." The
Ford Pinto was described as an "inexpensive compact car." VISCUSI, supra note 26, at 111.
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358 (Ct. App. 1981).
64.
65. This award is the first blockbuster punitive damages award included in the data set used
in the article by Viscusi & McMichael, supra note 12.
66. 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 359-60.
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punitive damages.6 9 The punitive damages award was later reduced to
$3.5 million.70
What was most noteworthy about the case and the ensuing
debate about Ford's safety practices is that Ford had performed a risk
analysis and concluded that the less-safe design was preferable. 7 1 Trial
lawyer Stuart Speiser termed the analysis "the most remarkable
document ever produced in an American lawsuit." 72 Although the
Grimshaw case pertained to the risk of fire due to rear impacts, Ford's
risk analysis pertained to gas tank design changes that might reduce
risks of fires associated with rollovers. 73 Ford undertook the study in
anticipation of a prospective safety regulation by NHTSA. 74 Even
though Ford's study was not related to fire risks arising from rear
impacts, the analysis was used in court to characterize Ford's alleged
callous disregard for life. 75

Table 1 summarizes the benefit and cost calculations in Ford's
analysis. 7 6 The calculated costs associated with the design change of
$137.5 million are almost triple the safety benefits of $49.6 million,
making the change apparently undesirable from a benefit-cost
perspective. However, the components of the benefits analysis are
seriously flawed. Consider the $200,000 value that Ford placed on each
burn death. Ford based this figure on the amount that the estate for a
fatally injured person is typically compensated in court cases, which is
principally the present value of the net income of the deceased. 77
However, these amounts are focused on meeting the income losses
suffered by the survivors, not on preventing the loss of life to the
accident victim. The correct economic valuation of preventing a small
risk of death is governed by the VSL, which is much greater than this
figure. 8 Similarly, burn injuries suffered in a crash often inflict severe
pain and sometimes permanent disfigurement so that the value of
preventing these risks will surely be greater than the average
compensatory damages value.
69. Id. at 358.
70. Id.; see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the FordPinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013
(1991).
71. Schwartz, supra note 70, at 1020-26.
72. Stuart Speiser, LAWSUIT 357 (1980).
73. Schwartz, supra note 70, at 1020.
74. Id. at 1018.
75. Id. at 1020-21.
76. See infra Part IX tbl.1 (summary of Ford's analysis).
77. Arthur Lewbel, Calculating Compensation in Cases of Wrongful Death, 113 J.
ECONOMETRICS 115, 115 (2003).
78. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 19 tbl.2, for a summary of estimates of the value of
statistical life.
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Ford was pilloried for undertaking an analysis that tried to take
a hard look at the costs and benefits of a design change.7 9 Ideally, we
want to encourage companies to think systematically about safety.
However, companies should do so in a responsible way. Dramatically
underestimating the value of reducing health risks was a serious
deficiency of Ford's approach. Use of a compensatory damages payment
to value lives should have evoked some concerns about whether Ford
was placing adequate weight on the lives at risk.
B. The Inherent Challenge to Risk Analysis Posed by Hindsight Bias
The Ford Pinto analysis also highlights a challenge that Ford
would have faced even if it had done a proper analysis. The cost of the
design change to prevent the fuel-related fire injuries and deaths was
only $11 per vehicle.SO When jurors confront an identifiable fatality that
could have been prevented for $11, the jurors will not be considering a
comparison of the total costs and benefits across the entire product line.
Rather, the comparison is between the life that has been lost and a
relatively inexpensive change to the car. This ex post frame of reference
that is an inherent feature of tort litigation is certainly not the
appropriate frame to use in judging any risk decision that must be made
before the risk outcomes are known. Because it is so difficult for people
to overcome hindsight bias and place themselves in the pre-accident
situation, it is vital that firms avoid undervaluing the lives at risk.
The prominent role that hindsight bias plays in jury
deliberations with respect to product safety has been a major concern
of Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, who made the following
observations in an escalator injury case in which a person was injured
after someone pushed the stop button on an escalator:
The ex post perspective of litigation exerts a hydraulic force that distorts judgment.
Engineers design escalators to minimize the sum of construction, operation, and injury
costs. Department stores, which have nothing to gain from maiming their customers and
employees, willingly pay for cost-effective precautions . . .. Come the lawsuit, however,
the passenger injured by a stop presents himself as a person, not a probability. Jurors see
today's injury; persons who would be injured if buttons were harder to find and use are
invisible. Although witnesses may talk about them, they are spectral figures,
81
insubstantial compared to the injured plaintiff, who appears in the flesh.

In this case, the company's tradeoff involved the identified person who
was injured by someone pushing the escalator button as compared to
79. Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 1977, available at
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness, archived at http://perma.cc/GDE736FD.
80.
Schwartz, supra note 70, at 1020.
81.
Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1990).
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all the unidentified persons who were protected by the safety button. In
the jury's mind, identified lives that have been harmed will count more
than unknown number of statistical lives that have been protected.
C. Other ControversialFord Risk Analyses
The role of hindsight bias coupled with corporate risk analyses
extended beyond the Pinto. Ford did not fare much better in a
subsequent case involving a risk analysis that the court termed "safety
science management."8 2 In Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, Terri
Stubblefield was in the rear seat of a Ford Mustang II and was killed
after being hit from behind by a car traveling about sixty miles per hour,
turning the rear seat of the car into a "ball of fire." 83 To punish Ford for
making an explicit-and unacceptable-tradeoff between cost and risk
reductions, the jury awarded $8 million in punitive damages:
The evidence here was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the sum of $8 million
was an amount necessary to deter Ford from repeating its conduct; that is, its conscious
decision to defer implementation of safety devices in order to protect its profits. One
internal memo estimated that "the total financial effect of the Fuel System Integrity
program [would] reduce Company profits over the 1973-1976 cycle by $(109) million," and
recommended that Ford "defer adoption of the [safety measures] on all affected cars until
1976 to realize a design cost savings of $20.9 million compared to 1974." Another Ford
84
document referred to a $2 million cost differential as "marginal."

The economic use of the term "marginal" means "incremental" with
respect to the additional costs of a design change, not that the costs
were very low and sufficiently trivial that being guided by marginal
costs reflects a flagrant
disregard for safety.8 5 However,
misinterpreting this terminology reinforces the callous image of the
company that the attorneys sought to create.
In another case involving a systematic risk analysis, Ford was
penalized with a punitive damages award in Miles v. Ford Motor Co.,
an award which was subsequently overturned.8 6 In this instance, the
controversial risk analysis concerned a "tension eliminator" for the
shoulder harness on a seatbelt.8 7 The failure of this part caused Willie
Miles, the passenger, to slide through the seat belt after a collision and

82.
Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d 470, 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
83.
Id. at 474.
84. Id. at 481.
85.
For illustration of the role of marginal benefits and marginal costs in setting efficient
regulatory standards, see Viscusi, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 22, at 30-33.
86.
Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 141 S.W.3d 309, 319 (Tex. App. 2004).
87. Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tex. App. 1996), remanded for procedural
errors, Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1998).

2015]1

PRICING LIVES

1137

suffer head and spinal injuries.8 8 Once again, Ford was faulted for
undertaking a risk analysis and not incurring the cost for the safety
improvement:
Syson [the plaintiffs' accident reconstruction expert] testified that when Ford identified
what it believed was a defective product it would first run a "cost benefit" analysis to see
what the cost would be to fix or repair the defect. Next, Ford would assign arbitrary values
to each death or serious injury and would predict the number of occurrences which would
involve either death or serious injury. Finally, Ford would determine the cost to litigate
such deaths and injuries. Syson testified that if the cost to repair the defect exceeded the
89
other costs, Ford would not correct the defect.

Ford's efforts to undertake a benefit-cost analysis were well
founded from an economic standpoint. However, using court awards in
personal injury cases as the yardstick for valuing risk to life and health
dramatically understates the level of benefits associated with greater
safety. In this instance, the court overturned the punitive damages
award and the finding that Ford was "grossly negligent" because Ford's
tension eliminators were consistent with those found to be acceptable
in a regulatory analysis by NHTSA. 90
D. A Similar Risk Analysis Controversyfor Chrysler
Chrysler Corporation has also been faulted for undertaking a
risk analysis. In the blockbuster awards case, Jimenez v. Chrysler
Corp., the jury awarded $250 million in punitive damages because of
risk-cost comparisons very similar to those in the Ford Pinto case.91
After his mother ran a red light, Sergio Jimenez, who was an unbuckled
passenger in his mother's Dodge Caravan, was thrown from the vehicle
and killed. 92 A better door latch could have prevented him from being
thrown from the vehicle, but Chrysler concluded that the costs of such
a door latch outweighed the value of reducing the risks.9 3 According to
the plaintiffs posttrial memorandum:
Chrysler officials at the highest level cold-bloodedly calculated that acknowledging the
problem and fixing it would be more expensive, in terms of bad publicity and lost sales,

88. Id. at 578-79.
89. Id. at 588-89.
90. Id. at 589.
91. See Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439, 443 (4th Cir. 2001); Jimenez v.
Chrysler Corp., No. 2: 96-1269-11, 1997 WL 743644, at *1 (LRP Jury) (S.C. Oct. 8, 1997).
92. Jimenez, 269 F.3d at 443; Nichole M. Christian, Angelo B. Henderson & Asra Q Nomani,
Chrysler Is Told to Pay $262.5 Million by Jurors in Minivan-Accident Trial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
1997, at A3.
93. Jimenez, 269 F.3d at 444-46, 449.
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than concealing the defect and litigating the wrongful death suits that inevitably would
result.94

The cost and risk reduction comparisons mirror the types of
concerns in Judge Easterbrook's hindsight example. On the cost side,
there would be a one-time tooling cost of $100,000 and a unit cost of
$0.50 per vehicle for the new, superior part.95 Comparison of the $0.50
cost with the loss of an identified person's life will lead to an adverse
judgment for Chrysler, but this is not the appropriate comparison. At
the time of the product safety design decision, the company must deal
with assessed probabilities of accidents, not identified prospective
deaths. Even if the Chrysler analysis had been undertaken using sound
benefit values, taking the jury back to the decision Chrysler faced before
the accident occurred would require overcoming the well-established
role of hindsight bias.
E. The GM Risk Analysis of Fuel Tank Risks
GM also has not fared well in instances in which it has
undertaken a risk analysis pertaining to the tradeoffs between vehicle
cost and risk. In the 1998 Georgia case GM Corp. v. Moseley, GM had
undertaken a risk analysis pertaining to the design of the side saddle
fuel tanks. 96 Although Moseley survived the initial impact when his GM
pickup truck was broadsided by a drunk driver, he suffered fatal burn
injuries after his truck's gas tank ruptured and caught fire. 97 The
design of the fuel tank, which led to Moseley's death, had been the
subject of a previous GM analysis and a corporate decision not to
increase the safety of the vehicle.9 8
After a witness presented GM's detailed risk analysis of fuel-fed
fires, a "constant refrain among the jurors interviewed" was that "they
knew" about the risk. 99 The inherent problem of undertaking a risk
analysis for any safety-related feature is that, if the company does not
adopt the most protective safety option, the perception that the
company chose to ignore a known risk will always be a danger.
94.
See Donald C. Dilworth, JurorsPunish Chryslerfor Hiding Deadly Defect, TRIAL, Feb. 1,
1998, at 14, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Jurors+punish+Chrysler+for+hiding+
deadly+defect.-a020379898, archived at http://perma.cc/3XXS-XD3Z.
95.
Id. at 16.
447 S.E.2d 302, 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
96.
97. Id. at 305.
98.
See E.C. IVEY, VALUE ANALYSIS OF AUTO FUEL FED FIRE RELATED FATALITIES (1973),
available at http://www.autosafety.org/GMAttN.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XQ35-Y89H;
Terence Moran, GM Burns Itself, AM. LAW., Apr. 1993, at 68, 73.
99.
See Moran, supra note 98, at 69 (describing the trial strategies, proceedings, and
deliberations in Moseley).
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According to GM's risk analysis, which was prepared by GE engineer
Edward Ivey in 1973, fuel-fed fires would lead to a maximum of around
"650-1000 fatalities per year in accidents with fuel-fed fires where the
bodies were burnt."10 0 Ivey's analysis assigned a value per fatality of
$200,000,101 which is reminiscent of Ford's use of average compensatory
damages awards in wrongful death cases to value the expected fatalities
that would be prevented. The memo's calculations found that the
estimated fatality cost per automobile currently operating would be
about $2.40. 102 For new cars produced in the current model year, the
estimated accident cost would be $2.20 per vehicle. 103 Preventing fuelfed fires at costs greater than this $2.20 per vehicle figure therefore
would not be worthwhile based on this calculation. Ivey's bottom-line
conclusion on the accident costs was the following:
This analysis indicates that for G.M. it would be worth approximately $2.20 per new
model auto to prevent a fuel fed fire in all accidents . . . . This analysis must be tempered
with two thoughts. First, it is really impossible to put a value on human life. This analysis
tried to do so in an objective manner but a human fatality is really beyond value,
subjectively. Secondly, it is impossible to design an automobile where fuel fed fires can be
prevented in all accidents unless the automobile has a non-flammable fuel. 104

Notwithstanding his expressed misgivings about the value of a human
fatality, Ivey's analysis produced an extremely low value of safety that
would make safety improvements to eliminate fuel-fed fires not
worthwhile if they cost more than $2.20 per new vehicle.
The jury awarded $4 million in compensatory damages, $1 in
pain and suffering, and a blockbuster punitive damages amount of $101
million. 105 This blockbuster punitive damages award was based on the
company's risk analysis and the specific fuel fire risks involved in the
case, not the overall safety of the vehicles, as GM trucks were involved
in only slightly more fatalities per 10,000 crashes than Ford trucks
(1.51 deaths versus 1.45 deaths). 106 The construction of the punitive
damages number was based on an irrelevant mathematical exercisethe value of $20 per vehicle multiplied by 500,000 GM trucks on the
road, plus an extra $1 million "exclamation point." 0 7 It is noteworthy
that the value of the lives that were lost due to the product design never
entered the plaintiff attorney's damages request or the jury's
100. IVEY, supra note 98, at 1.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id.
105. GM Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 305 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
106. Walter Olson, The Most Dangerous Vehicle on the Road, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1993,
http://walterolson.com/articles/gmtrucks.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4WFB-Z8WU.
107. Moran, supra note 98, at 82.
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conceptualization of the punitive damages amount. From the
standpoint of proper deterrence, the number of fatalities and the VSL
associated with these fatalities should play a central role in establishing
the appropriate level of deterrence.
F. Use of the Fuel Risk Analysis Memo against GM in Automobile
Litigation
The Ivey memo resurfaced in a subsequent rear-end crash
involving a 1979 Chevrolet Malibu. Patricia Anderson, her four
children, and a family friend suffered severe burns after her Chevrolet
Malibu was hit in the rear by a speeding drunk driver when Anderson
was approaching a red light.10 8 The six burn victims received a
compensatory damages award of $107.6 million and a punitive damages
award of $4.8 billion, making it the largest blockbuster award in any
motor-vehicle case. 109 Some observers speculated that the landmark
Master Settlement Agreement in the cigarette litigation had an
anchoring effect, leading jurors to think in terms of award levels in the
billions rather than the millions. 110
Once again, the VSL and the value of preventing risks of death
did not enter the procedure for setting the punitive damages award. The
jury used two benchmarks-linking the $4.8 billion figure to GM's
advertising expenses over a long period 1 ' and "two-thirds more than
GM's entire profit for 1998."112 Such reference points should be
irrelevant. In any reasonable approach to setting punitive damages to
promote safety, the value of preventing fatalities must be a critical
component. Instead, the jury utilized a form of voodoo economics that

108. See Andrew Pollack, $4.9 Billion Jury Verdict in G.M. Fuel Tank Case, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 1999, at As, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/10/us/4.9-billion-jury-verdict-in-gmfuel-tank-case.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TM3S-U6LN; GM Hit by $4.9 Billion Verdict,
CNN, July 9, 1999, http://money.cnn.com/1999/07/09/home-auto/gm-verdict/, archived at
http://perma.cc/2XEE-R6AS.
109. See Pollack, supra note 108.
110. See Ann W. O'Neill, Henry Weinstein & Eric Malnic, GM Ordered to Pay $4.9 Billion in
Crash Verdict Liability, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at Al ("Legal experts say the verdict was the
largest ever in a personal injury case."); Frank Swoboda & Caroline E. Mayer, Jury Hits GM with
Historic Crash Verdict, WASH. POST, July 10, 1999, at A01, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationallongterm/supcourt/stories/jury071099.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/3GWC-U6QZ (quoting a nationally recognized lawyer who said, "[The new figures
of billions of dollars that have begun to be tossed around in the tobacco cases have changed the
perspective of the American jurors.").
111 Michael White, $4.9 Billion Awarded in Gas Tank Accident, TOPEKA CAP.-J., July 10,
1999, http://cjonline.com/stories/071099/bus-gmaward.shtml#.VPYOQPnF98F, archivedat http://
perma.cc/NYS4-8C2P.
112. Swoboda & Mayer, supra note 110.
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led the Washington Post to observe that such punitive damages awards
"send a message to the public at large that the courts are more like a
casino than a hall of justice."113
The cost-risk tradeoff in the Ivey memo played a central role in
assessing the safety of GM's designs. According to the plaintiffs, moving
the tank an additional nine inches away from the bumper would have
eliminated the risk for a cost of $8.59 per vehicle. 1 14 Compared to a
benefit of reduced risks to life that averages $2.20 per vehicle for new
vehicles and $2.40 per vehicle for existing vehicles, the measure failed
a benefit-cost test since costs were about four times as great as benefits.
The plaintiffs' lawyers were able to demonize GM based on this
analysis. In post-trial comments, one plaintiffs lawyer concluded: "The
jurors wanted to send a message to General Motors that human life is
more important than profits."11 5 Jurors echoed this perspective: "Jurors
told reporters that they felt the company had valued life too lightly.
'We're just like numbers, I feel, to them,' one juror, Carl Vangelisti, told
Reuters. 'Statistics. That's something that is wrong.' "116
Economists are more comfortable with numbers than these
jurors, but a critical problem with GM's numbers to value lives is that
they were too small. GM grossly undervalued the reduced fatality risks
from preventing fuel-fed fires. The conclusion that the costs of
preventing the fires exceed the benefits hinges quite critically on the
value assigned to the reduced fatalities. Based on estimates in the
economics literature around at the time of the trial, the VSL was $7
million (in year 2000 dollars), or thirty-five-times greater than what
GM used in the analysis. 117 Rather than failing a benefit-cost test,
moving the gas tank to prevent fuel-fed fires provides safety benefits
that greatly exceed costs, easily passing a properly executed benefitcost test.1 18 Using statistics need not undervalue life or lead to less-safe
cars if the valuations are undertaken properly.

113. Editorial, Casino Justice, WASH. POST, July 13, 1999, at A18.
114. Andrew Pollack, $4.9 Billion Jury Verdict in GM Fuel Tank Case: Penalty Highlights
Cracks in Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at A8, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/1999/07/10/us/4.9-billion-jury-verdict-in-gm-fuel-tank-case.html,
archived at
http://perma.cc/JD32-USLX.
115. Id. (quoting Brian J. Panish, lawyer for the accident victims).
116. Id.
117. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 63 (stating that the median value of a statistical
life is about $7 million).
118. The value of fifty-five fatalities at $7 million per fatality is $385 million. With five million
automobiles produced each year, the safety benefit per automobile is ($385 million/5 million
automobiles), or $77.00 benefit per vehicle, which is almost an order of magnitude greater than
the $8.59 per vehicle cost.
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However, even if the analysis had been done properly, GM would
have faced a considerable challenge in convincing jurors of the
desirability of making risk-cost tradeoffs. One juror expressed a "zerorisk mentality" in her observation: "There was no evidence that the car
they put out there was as safe as what they could have put out there." 119
A similar zero-risk mentality phenomenon was borne out in
experimental studies of consumers' willingness to pay for reduced risks
from toilet bowl cleaner and pesticide. Studies have found consumers
willing to pay a huge premium to reduce the risks from 5/10,000 (0.05%)
to zero, with values far exceeding what they were willing to pay for
much larger product risk reductions that did not lead to zero risk. 120
G. Other GM Risk Analysis Controversies
GM's problems with risk assessments also have included its risk
analyses of allegedly faulty door latches in the Chevrolet Blazer. Based
on the plaintiffs experts, GM's estimate of the cost of fixing the safety
latch problem was $916 million, or $216 million for parts and $700
million for labor. 12 1 As characterized in the court proceedings, the
presence of the risk analysis showed that GM was aware of the risk
based on crash tests, had calculated the costs to fix the problem, and
had concluded that the costs outweighed the risk reduction benefits. 1 2 2
A man who was paralyzed in a crash implicating the alleged door latch
problems received a total award of $150 million, including a $100
million blockbuster punitive damages award. 123 Once again, a corporate
risk analysis played a central role in a blockbuster punitive damages
awards case.
H. Lessons Learned
Officials at GM and other U.S. automobile companies have been
able to observe the ramifications of risk analyses undertaken by their
company and by other firms. Such analyses leave companies vulnerable
to charges that they were aware of possible safety improvements but
119. Jeffrey Ball & Milo Geyelin, General Motors Is Ordered by a Jury to Pay $4.9 Billion in
Fuel-Fire Case, WALL ST. J., A3 (July 12, 1999), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB931552704721866921.
120. See W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley Magat & Joel Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality of
Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465, 474 (1987).
121. See J. Stratton Shartel, Defense Timeline Plays Key Role in Trial Against GM, INSIDE
LIT., July 1996, at 1, 3.
122. Id.
123. Id. (discussing Hardy v. General Motors Corp., No. CV-93-56 (Lowndes Cnty. Ala. Cir.
Ct. June 3,1996)).
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chose not to incur the costs to bolster product safety. Companies have
been vilified for undertaking these assessments, often triggering
substantial punitive damages awards. Because these assessments can
lead jurors to the conclusion that companies have a callous or
indifferent attitude toward consumer safety, companies might
reasonably respond by ceasing to undertake risk analyses at all. I have
not found any recent risk analyses with respect to the ignition-switch
problems or other issues, and the internal review of the ignition-switch
problem commissioned by GM did not report any such assessments.
Recall that the previous assessments undervalued lives by using
the value of tort awards in wrongful death cases to calculate the
benefits from additional safety measures. A risk assessment based on
sound economic principles might be less vulnerable in court. We should
not be so quick to dismiss a potential role for meaningful risk analyses
because the corporate alternative of forgoing risk analyses, as well as
failing to address safety concerns and associated tradeoffs in vehicle
design, would be less effective in advancing consumer welfare. Even
from the standpoint of corporate profits, it is not clear that it is
desirable to adopt a corporate culture in which frank discussions of
safety matters are discouraged and sanctioned. The costs of ignoring
the safety concerns may be greater than the costs of adequately
addressing product defects.
V. WOULD SOUND RISK ANALYSES FARE BETTER OR POSE
NEW HAZARDS?

Whether analyses with different valuations of life might be more
successful in addressing jurors' concerns can be examined using
experimental studies. In this Part, I summarize the results of a series
of experiments in which jury-eligible citizens considered various case
scenarios involving corporate risk decisions. The findings suggest that
there remains substantial resistance to even sound economic risk
analyses. This Part concludes by suggesting possible legal reforms that
would serve to incentivize corporations undertaking sound risk
assessments.
A. Experimental Findings on Punitive Damages and Risk Analyses
Historically, GM and other auto companies were hit with
considerable penalties when the companies attempted to systematically
examine the tradeoffs between risk and cost. Is undertaking such a costrisk analysis necessarily a red flag that leads jurors to conclude that
the company has displayed a callous disregard for human health?
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Ideally, companies should not be found liable for punitive damages if
they used an appropriate VSL and adopted all safety measures for
which the expected health benefits exceeded the cost.
In earlier works, I completed two experimental studies that
explored jurors' potential sensitivity to responsible risk-cost tradeoffs
using a total sample of almost seven hundred jury-eligible citizens. 124
The studies presented respondents with case scenarios that differed in
terms of whether the company did a risk analysis and the nature of the
analysis that it undertook. Each sample group received a different case
scenario. The scenarios principally differed in terms of how expensive
it was for the company to reduce fatality risks with improved designs.
Consider the first study, in which all scenarios given to
respondents stated that the additional manufacturing cost of the
vehicles per life saved was $4 million. More specifically, the company
could change the electrical system design of the vehicle at a cost of $40
million to prevent ten expected deaths. Doing so would cost $400 per
vehicle. Additionally, in all of the scenarios, the survey told respondents
that the courts had awarded the victim's families $800,000 for pain and
suffering and other compensatory damages and that after this case, the
company altered future designs to eliminate the problem. After
providing participants with standard jury instructions for punitive
damages, they were asked whether they would favor an award of
punitive damages and, if so, what the amount would be.
In the first scenario, the company did not perform any benefitcost analysis and chose not to adopt a particular safety-enhancing
feature. The respondents received the following information about the
company: "The company thought there might be some risk from the
current design but did not believe it would be significant. The company
notes that even with these injuries, the vehicle has one of the best safety
records in its class." 125 A striking 85% of the participants favored
12 6
punitive damages, with a median punitive award of $1 million.
In the next case scenario, the company undertook a risk analysis
of the prospective safety improvement. The approach was similar to
that used in the Ford and GM examples in that the company assigned

124. Further details of the first of these studies are reported in W. Kip Viscusi, CorporateRisk
Analysis: A Reckless Act? 52 STAN. L. REV. 547 (2000) [hereinafter Viscusi, Corporate Risk
Analysis], and W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages:How JurorsFailto Promote Efficiency, 39 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 139 (2002) [hereinafter Viscusi, Punitive Damages]. The sample in this first study was
489, and 206 jury-eligible citizens participated in a sequel.
125. Viscusi, CorporateRisk Analysis, supra note 124, at 554.
126. Id. at 556, 594. Another scenario involving a cost per life saved of $1 million yielded
similar results, with 92% of the mock jurors favoring punitive damages, with a median award of
$1 million. All scenarios discussed in the text below involve a cost per life saved of $4 million.
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a value to the expected lives lost based on court awards and used the
compensatory damages amount of $800,000 to value each fatality.
Undertaking such analysis in this scenario did not alter the likelihood
of a punitive damages award but did boost the median award level to
$3.5 million. Thus, valuing lives based on the compensatory damages
amount led to a larger punitive award than undertaking no risk
analysis at all. Here, respondents resisted the company's attempt to
monetize fatality risks and wanted to send the company a price signal
that exceeded the $800,000 amount the company used to value lives.
What if the respondents are told that the company used the VSL
that NHTSA uses in its regulatory analyses of safety measures, which
at the time of the study was $3 million? This scenario should have been
more favorable to the company in two ways. First, the value assigned
to the fatalities at risk is almost four times as great as when the
company uses court awards; thus, the company is not undervaluing the
lives lost. Second, the company is following established safety norms
adopted by the government agency charged with setting safety
standards. Nevertheless, the respondents continued to take an
unfavorable view of benefit-cost analyses. There was no reduction in the
frequency of punitive damages award, and the median award escalated
to $10 million. 12 7
Why did placing a higher value on the lives at risk and
consequently making safety a more prominent concern adversely affect
the damages levied against the company? A reasonable hypothesis is
that the $3 million VSL figure used by the company established an
anchor that the jurors had to top in order to establish greater financial
incentives for safety than the company already displayed in its. risk
analysis. Thus, instead of high VSL numbers reducing the sanctions
against the company, valuing lives more highly and adhering to the
benefit-cost practices of a government agency had counterproductive
effects. If these experimental results are borne out in practice, doing the
analysis correctly with higher valuations of fatalities may boost court
verdicts rather than reduce them.
To explore ways in which this discouraging outcome could be
avoided, a sequel to the study, involving over one hundred jury-eligible
adults for each scenario, altered the company risk analysis
description. 128 In one scenario the company performed a benefit-cost
analysis but ignored it, while in another scenario the company
attempted to persuade jurors that benefit-cost tradeoffs are reasonable.
Perhaps if jurors understood the constructive role that risk analyses
127. Id.
128. Viscusi, Punitive Damages, supra note 124, at 139-67.
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could play in fostering appropriate vehicle designs with safety features
that consumers truly valued, there would be less of a tendency to want
to punish corporations for risk analyses.
Consider first the scenario in which an employee at the company
undertook a benefit-cost analysis, but the company didn't utilize the
employee's analysis in the safety design decision. "The company said it
never used the study in the design of the vehicle. It was an analysis by
a staff engineer that did not play any role in the design decision." 129
Apparently doing an analysis and ignoring it is slightly less
reprehensible than doing an analysis but more reprehensible than
doing no analysis at all. Compared to the situation in which the risk
analysis guides the company's safety decision, doing an analysis that is
ignored led to a frequency of punitive award verdicts of 89% and
reduced the median award to $3 million. 130
Conceivably a more favorable scenario is one in which, instead
of ignoring the analysis or not undertaking a risk analysis at all, there
is information provided in an attempt to persuade jurors that benefitcost analyses have a useful, constructive role to play. Such a scenario
that attempted to overcome jurors' aversion to cost-risk tradeoffs
provided the following additional information:
The company had undertaken a series of similar risk analyses for other safety measures.
These studies led to improved structural reinforcements in the doors, stability controls,
and other improvements. But in this instance the company concluded that the extra costs
to consumers were too great in comparison to the safety benefits. The company chose
instead to make other design changes that might save more lives at less cost. 131

This effort to convey the constructive role of benefit-cost analysis
reduced the frequency of jurors favoring punitive awards to 76%, which
is the lowest punitive award percentage in the scenarios tested in the
two studies, and reduced the median award to $1 million. Note that this
median punitive damages award level is the same as was found when
the company did no benefit-cost analysis at all. 13 2 In effect, providing a
rational basis for the benefit-cost analysis can neutralize and have some
modest reduction in resistance to risk analyses as compared to the noanalysis situation.
How a risk analysis would fare based on current fatality benefit
assessment practices is not clear. A more vigorous and concrete
articulation of the benefits of risk analysis and use of the current,
higher VSL of $9.1 million may persuade jurors of the legitimacy of cost129. Id. at
130. Id. at
131. Id. at
132. Id. at
$3.0 million for

155.
166.
155.
166. However, the geometric mean award dropped to $2.1 million as compared to
the no analysis scenario.
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risk tradeoffs. However, the higher VSL also may have a
counterproductive anchoring effect in instances where punitive
damages are awarded, pushing jurors to award higher levels of punitive
damages in order to provide greater financial incentives for safety than
the company's own valuations of risk would provide.
Even with a well-motivated benefit-cost analysis, the public will
generally be uncomfortable with a risk decision that leads to a higher
fatality rate when other, more expensive choices are available.
Government safety agencies generally claim that their mission is to
make cars, planes, drugs, and food "safe." 133 They could make more
accurate claims, such as that the agency hopes that the food safety
regulations can limit the annual number of fatalities related to food
illnesses to under three thousand. Confronting safety decisions in a
responsible and open manner will continue to pose challenges, but
failing to think systematically about these issues will lead to policies
that are less effective in saving lives.
B. A Proposalfor Overcoming the Aversion to Risk Analyses
To address the inherent challenges proposed by risk analyses
and to simultaneously encourage companies to think systematically
about safety, it is desirable to give companies legal protections so that
the content of the risk assessments cannot be used against them in
trials. It would be beneficial to establish a safe harbor for risk analyses
that follow the procedures used for federal regulatory impact analyses
and that adopt the VSL used by the U.S. Department of Transportation.
If such an analysis indicates that a particular design feature implicated
in an accident did not pass a benefit-cost test, the company should be
able to introduce this evidence in its defense, but the plaintiff should
not be permitted to introduce it separately. A company that does not
adopt a safety measure that fails a benefit-cost test is not negligent, but
plaintiffs may misconstrue such studies as indicating that the company
knowingly chose to market an unsafe product. If the analysis indicated
that the design feature did pass a benefit-cost test and the company
nevertheless chose to not adopt the design, there should be no legal
protection for the analysis.
One could easily envision that over time there might be a
rationale for stronger versions of such a proposal. There could, for
example, be a regulatory compliance defense against lawsuits alleging
negligence for the particular design choice if the company's analysis met
133. For example, companies must show the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products.
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012).
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government standards and the company adopted designs that passed a
benefit-cost test. To formalize this process, companies could file the risk
analyses with the U.S. Department of Transportation, which could
assume a formal role of reviewing and approving the risk assessments.
Either of these safe harbor proposals could yield several
dividends. By stimulating risk analyses, there would be a dramatic shift
in the current corporate culture in which there has been a pronounced
retreat from confronting safety issues. Incentivizing companies to take
on the same methodology and VSL levels that the government uses
would put the analysis on sound footing. The VSL is the value of life
that a benefit-cost analysis should use in evaluating the desirability of
a safety feature. This approach, in turn, would lead to design changes
that are in consumers' best interest. Dampening the liability risks
posed by undertaking benefit-cost analyses would also shift the focus of
these cases to the substantive merits of the accident and away from a
conception that anything less than an unbounded commitment to safety
is an irresponsible corporate act.

VI. WHY VALUATION OF PRODUCT DEFECTS MAY BE DIFFERENT THAN
THE VALUE OF SAFETY FEATURES

Certainly a productive starting point for corporate risk analyses
is to utilize government estimates of the VSL to value the expected lives
saved from additional safety measures. However, relying on a single
number may not capture the degree of variation in the tradeoff between
costs and mortality risks depending on the direction of change in the
risk level and the particular segments of the population who are
affected. This Part examines such refinements that could lead to a
bolstering of the emphasis on safety, particularly with respect to
unanticipated product defects.
A. Why Defects and Safety Attributes Differ
Proper valuation of product safety may require distinguishing
between the value of risk reductions from safety improvements and the
value of risk increases from product defects. Consumers' valuation of
product defects, such as a faulty ignition switch that was expected to
operate properly, could be quite different than the valuation of
additional vehicle safety features that the consumer chose to forgo.
Each situation involves a tradeoff between vehicle cost and risk, and
the risk decrease from the safety feature may be the same as the risk
increase from the product defect. However, product defects in which the
vehicle fails to perform in a manner that is consistent with industry
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norms and the consumer's expectations regarding vehicle safety may be
valued much more highly than safety-enhancing improvements. The
rationales for different treatment include influences that can be traced
to both behavioral economic factors and more conventional economic
concerns.
Consider an assessment of the valuation of product defects using
the VSL as the starting point for benefit valuation. Suppose the
consumer is considering buying a new car and faces a choice between
two models. One model has added safety features that reduce the
fatality risk by 1/100,000 but costs $100 more. Because the consumer
has a VSL of $9.1 million, the safer car is worth only $91 more, making
the less-safe car the preferred alternative because it is $100 cheaper.
Suppose instead that the consumer's current car has a product defect
that increases the fatality risk over the life of the car by 1/100,000.
Based on an average VSL of $9.1 million, that consumer will suffer an
expected loss of $91. Since the risk changes of 1/100,000 are identical
for the product defect on the current car and for the forgone safety
equipment on the prospective new car, shouldn't the consumer have the
same valuation in each case? If the cost to the company of recalling and
repairing the defect exceeds $91, based on how much the consumer
values his own well-being, is the company on solid ground in deciding
to fix the cars? Would paying $91 to each owner of a defective vehicle
make them just as well off as they would have been without such a
defect?
B. Why Defects May Be Valued More Highly
Despite the risk and cost parallels of product defects and forgone
safety improvements, the situations involving product defects and
safety equipment for new cars may be quite different. For starters, the
consumer is worse off after learning about the defect unless the auto
manufacturer pays the consumer $91. If the consumer is not
compensated for the product defect in any way, there will be a loss
relative to the situation the consumer would have been in had the
vehicle not developed a defect.
In the case of the product defect, something has been taken away
from the consumer. The consumer has suffered a loss from the expected
level of safety. There is often a profound behavioral asymmetry in how
people react to such a loss rather than a comparable gain, even though
this asymmetry is inconsistent with standard economic models.1 34

134. W. Kip Viscusi & Joel Huber, Reference-Dependent Valuations of Rish: Why Willingnessto-Accept Exceeds Willingness-to-Pay, 44 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 19, 20 (2012).
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This asymmetry is present in a wide variety of contexts,
including those in which aspects of risk are involved.135 Consider the
following experimental evidence with respect to how people have
different values for positive and negative changes in health risks posed
by widely used consumer products. In the first set of studies to be
discussed, which were undertaken by the Environmental Protection
Agency, hundreds of consumers considered a series of household
chemical products. 136 The survey administrators told the consumers
that the products had been reformulated.1 3 7 Some products posed
greater risks than before, and some posed lower risks. 1 38 In the case of
household insecticide, consumers were willing to pay an extra $1.04 per
bottle for an insecticide that reduced the inhalation risks and skin
poisoning risks by 5/10,000.139 How did consumers react to an
alternative version of the insecticide that posed an increase in risk of
an identical magnitude? When the survey asked an initial sample of
shoppers how much of a discount that they would require to purchase a
bottle of insecticide that posed an added injury risk of 5/10,000, almost
all the consumers balked at this opportunity.140 The consumers were
not even willing to be paid to use the riskier product.141 The reactions
were so strong that the researchers feared that people would stop
participating in the survey after being asked that question. The
researchers then revised the study so that the risk increase was only
1/10,000, or one-fifth the size of the risk decrease that they
considered. 142 Even with this reduction, 77% of the respondents refused
to buy the product, and those who did wanted a price reduction of $2.86,
or almost triple what they required for a risk decrease that was five
times as great. 143 The study found similar results for other types of
insecticide risks and for toilet bowl cleaner risks. 144
These results are mirrored in subsequent studies of how
households value the safety of drinking water. Increases in the
morbidity risk associated with drinking water are valued several times

135. Id; see also Viscusi, Magat & Huber, supra note 120, at 477.
136.

54 (1992)
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. Kip Viscusi, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 53-

(referencing chapter three, coauthored with Joel Huber).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
Id.
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as highly as comparable risk decreases. 145 The starting point seemed to
anchor consumers' cost and risk level reference points, and changes
from the accustomed reference point are not viewed equivalently. The
potential influence of such reference point effects is quite broad.1 46
An underlying psychological phenomenon driving these
disparities can be traced to the work of Kahneman and Tversky.1 4 7
Their work did not focus on probabilities or health risks but instead
dealt with accustomed income levels. People consider decreases in
income to be much worse than comparable increases, meaning that
people are very averse to income losses.1 4 8 This loss aversion
phenomenon and related behaviors have been characterized as "status
quo bias" by Zeckhauser and Samuelson.1 49 Economists have
documented a wide range of situations in which there are discrepancies
between willingness-to-pay values and willingness-to-accept values.150
For environmental goods, the average ratio of willingness-to-accept to
willingness-to-pay is over seven. 151
How one should treat disparities in the valuation of risk
increases and risk decreases that arise from behavioral factors is
unclear. Does the difference embody a form of irrationality in which
people overreact to increases in risk because they exaggerate the risk
levels? In that case, a premium for product defect risks does not appear
warranted. But what if the difference in the valuations reflects a more
fundamental concern that people do in fact suffer a real additional loss
when something that they had has been taken away, as compared to
the situation in which their baseline has never shifted but was always
lower? That type of behavioral effect appears to pose a more
fundamental loss. But unless the disparity between reactions to risk
increases and risk decreases can be shown to be a rational phenomenon
as opposed to an overreaction of misperception of risk changes, basing
compensation on the VSL is the appropriate yardstick.

145. Viscusi & Huber, supra note 134, at 27-36.
146. John K. Horowitz& Kenneth E. McConnell, AReview of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 426, 442 (2002).
147. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277-78 (1979).
148.

AMos TVERSKY, PREFERENCE, BELIEF, AND SIMILARITY: SELECTED WRITINGS 409 (Eldar

Shafir ed., 2004).
149. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 47-48 (1988).
150. See Tuba Tungel & James K. Hammitt, A New Meta-Analysis on the WTP/WTA
Disparity, 68 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 175 (2014) (summarizing existing studies analyzing
circumstances under which individuals' willingness to pay to avoid a certain risk differs from their
willingness to accept payment to subject themselves to a certain risk).
151. J.K. Horowitz & K.E. McConnell, supra note 146, at 428.
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Traditional economic reasons without any behavioral
underpinnings come into play. The $9.1 million VSL estimate is simply
an average across the worker population. One reason why involuntarily
imposed risks may impose large welfare losses is that there may be wide
variations in individual preferences. In a market situation in which
people are voluntarily exposed to the risk and receive compensation,
people can sort into the risky jobs and products consistent with their
preferences. People with a lower VSL will be more willing to undertake
risky pursuits and purchase less-safe cars. When the risks are imposed
involuntarily, there is no such matching process. Some people with very
high valuations of risk will suffer a loss if they are only compensated
based on the average VSL. Life and health are also distinctive in that
they are irreplaceable, thwarting efforts to suitably compensate people
after the fact for risks that these people did not choose. 152
Even people who are reluctant to bear risks always have some
cutoff on expenditures after which purchases of additional safety are
not worthwhile. Explorations of the heterogeneity of VSL in the labor
market yield some estimates as high as $20 million or more. 153 Such a
doubling of the VSL to reflect some people's valuation of involuntary
risks that are imposed on people who are particularly risk-averse boosts
the level of benefits when undertaking a benefit assessment but does
not undermine the procedure. If the average VSL across the population
is $9.1 million, then using a value of $20 million may be correct for some
people but will overvalue the risks of safety improvements to the great
majority of individuals. Unlike in market contexts in which known risks
can be matched to consumers based on their willingness to bear risk, no
such matching is possible for emerging hidden risks associated with
product defects. However, if the consumer population for the product
has risk preferences similar to the average worker, use of the VSL
remains appropriate.
Another possible economic rationale for treating product defects
differently is that the presence of unanticipated defects may affect the
consumer's overall assessment of the safety of the product. If the
ignition switch is defective, what other things might go wrong? The
existence of a product defect also may serve to undermine consumers'
overall sense of the safety of the product and could potentially lead to
consumer fears of other hazards. The resistance of the consumers in the
household chemical survey to purchase reformulated but riskier new
152. Even in a standard consumer product situation, if the product that has been taken away
cannot be replaced, compensating consumers based on the purchase price will not adequately
compensate any consumer whose valuation exceeded the purchase price.
153. Thomas J. Kniesner et al., Policy Relevant Heterogeneity in the Value of Statistical Life:
New Evidence from Panel Data Quantile Regressions, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 15, 28 (2010).
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products might have arisen because they wondered what kinds of
additional threats might be posed by a product that has been
reformulated and is now riskier than before. If one aspect of the product
is now more hazardous, should we be more concerned about other
potential hazards that have not yet been disclosed? And if the defect is
not disclosed, consumers are unaware of what precautionary actions
they should take to mitigate the risk, potentially resulting in a
preventable loss in health or unnecessary precautions.
Regardless of whether one wants to incorporate the differences
between willingness-to-pay values and willingness-to-accept values in
benefit assessment, it is likely that consumers will continue to view
emerging safety defects that are an unwelcome surprise as being much
more problematic than having the option to purchase less expensive
cars that have been equipped with fewer safety-related features.
Nevertheless, the VSL usually provides appropriate guidance for
valuing mortality risks and is not subject to distortions generated by
alarmist responses to risk.
VII. USING PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND REGULATORY PENALTIES TO
GENERATE ADEQUATE INCENTIVES FOR SAFETY

The VSL statistics that should play a fundamental role in
corporate risk decisions also should be the pivotal values in other
institutions' response to safety matters. That is, the VSL can provide
appropriate guidance for regulatory agencies in setting sanctions and
to the courts in their quest for the appropriate punitive damages
amounts. This Part outlines the general pertinence of the VSL measure
to establishing safety incentives and compares the likely award levels
using the VSL to the blockbuster punitive damages awards that have
been levied in motor-vehicle cases.
A. Regulatory Sanctions and Punitive Damages to Promote Safety
In a situation of product risk design, companies should use the
VSL to value the expected fatalities that are reduced. But what if the
company uses an inappropriately low value for prevented fatalities,
ignores the implications of a cost-risk tradeoff analysis, or doesn't do
any systematic analysis at all, leading to vehicles that lack highly
justified safety improvements? If the company is found liable for the
wrongful death of a person injured by the company's product, the usual
form of compensation is equal to the present value of lost earnings that
the household has suffered and the value of the services provided by the
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deceased-not the VSL. 154 That compensatory damages amount will not
provide adequate incentives for deterrence.
Similarly, government-imposed penalties are often quite limited
by statute. NHTSA, for example, can only level a civil penalty of up to
$7,000 for each violation of failing to notify the government of vehicle
defects, and the penalty for a related series of violations cannot exceed
$35 million. 155 In effect, regulatory damages are capped, whereas court
awards usually are not. 156
If the company's behavior meets the criteria for awarding
punitive damages, which are intended to punish and deter such conduct
in the future, the court award or regulatory penalty can achieve levels
of deterrence that sufficiently incentivize the company to choose the
efficient level of safety. In situations where there is a 100% chance that
the company will be caught for its behavior, the appropriate financial
incentive for deterrence purposes is provided by a cost penalty equal to
the VSL. Thus, either the regulatory penalty or, in the case of the
courts, the total award of compensatory and punitive damages should
equal the VSL. This amount will price safety at the correct levels.
It may be, however, that the company's behavior is not always
detectable. The company may, for example, have not disclosed key
information about defects or may have settled cases and sealed the
information relating to the case to prevent others from ascertaining
that there was a systematic defect in the product. If the chance of
detecting the company's behavior is 50%, then the appropriate total
award amount is 2VSL. If instead the chance of detection is only 10%,
then the efficient level of setting the award is 1OVSL.
This straightforward mathematical approach to damages has a
long history in the literature but has not yet been adopted by the
courts. 15 7 One practical difficulty is that once a company has been

brought to trial for marketing a defective product, the company's
behavior has been detected with certainty. The appropriate question to
ask is what was the probability of detection at the time the company
undertook the wrongful conduct? That probability and the VSL serve as
the two main components to setting the damages amount.

154. See Lewbel, supranote 77, at 115; Viscusi, supra note 19.
155. 49 U.S.C. § 30165(a)(1) (2012); 49 C.F.R. § 578.6(a) (2014).
156. There are some states with caps on punitive damages awards and on pain and suffering
awards, but no state caps economic loss.
157. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 1l1
HARV. L. REV. 869, 896-900 (1998). Earlier scholars that they cite on this issue include Jeremy
Bentham. The specific proposal here follows that of Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives
Through Punitive Damages, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 229, 238 (2010).
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Basing the appropriate sanction for failing to report the ignitionswitch defects on a readily identifiable risk is not appropriate in this
situation. The ignition-switch defect does not fit the well-known risk
paradigm. GM was able to keep the defect secret from NHTSA, the
government agency to which it is required by law to report safetyrelated defects, for at least seven years. 58 In addition, GM settled some
claims related to the ignition defect but did so with confidential
settlements in which the nature of the risk was not disclosed. 6 9 Thus,
in both the regulatory arena and judicial contexts, GM made a
concerted effort to keep the risks hidden. This established policy of
keeping the risks hidden lowers the probability of detection. If, for
example, the chance of identifying the defect and linking it to all the
harms was 1/10, the appropriate regulatory sanction for thirteen deaths

valued at $9.1 million each would be $118 million/0.1, or $1.18 billion.
Had NHTSA identified fifty deaths, the sanction would be $5.49 billion.
GM's corporate strategy of fostering secrecy with respect to
product-related risks is not unique to auto-safety situations. Hersch
identified a similar phenomenon with respect to medical devices.1 60 In
particular, companies settled cases involving leaking breast implants,
keeping the terms of the settlement confidential as well as the nature
of the risks.1 6 1 The companies did not notify the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") of the defects and kept the information out of
the public domain by making the settlements confidential.1 6 2
Government safety agencies such as NHTSA and the FDA lack
the resources to undertake the kind of detailed monitoring needed to
track the performance of products. Even if companies do not disclose
the financial terms of the settlements, they are required to disclose the
product defect to the respective government agency, which has the

158. GM reported the defect in 2014. Consent Order, supra note 1, at 2. In 2005, GM
considered proposed fixes of the ignition-switch problem, and in 2007 a Wisconsin trooper issued
a report on an ignition-switch-related fatality and sent it to GM, though there is no evidence that
the report was read. See VALUKAS, supranote 2, at 8, 115.
159. Paul M. Barrett, The GM Fiasco and Overuse of Secret Settlements: Four Blunt Points,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 25, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06archived at http://
25/the-gm-fiasco-and-the-overuse-of-secret-settlements-four-blunt-points,
perma.cc/GSB6-JZGA.
160. Joni Hersch, Breast Implants: Regulation, Litigation, and Science, in REGULATION
THROUGH LITIGATION 142, 172 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002). Note that these product defects included
subsequently well-established morbidity risk problems with breast implants that were targeted
by government regulations, such as product leakage, and extended well beyond the more widely
debated risks linked to leakage such as that of autoimmune diseases.
161. Id. at 170-72.
162. Id. at 172.
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option of making the information public. 1 6 3 While companies already
have such an obligation to report product defects, the sanctions for
subsequent efforts to keep the defects hidden by utilizing such
confidentiality agreements should be enhanced. These secretive efforts
serve to lower the probability of detection and dampen the safety
incentives that the courts and regulatory agencies can provide. If the
regulatory sanction for failing to report defects is linked to the
probability of detection, then efforts to hide the defect through
confidential settlements of litigation could be used in assessing the
probability of detection and boosting the appropriate regulatory
sanction.
The role of VSL in product safety situations is consequently
twofold. First, it sets the price that companies and regulatory agencies
should use in valuing the fatality risks associated with alternative
designs. Second, if the company has been found to be remiss and either
the courts or regulatory agencies wish to levy a penalty that
incentivizes the company to produce and sell products that provide for
an efficient level of safety, then incorporating the VSL in this procedure
is essential.
B. Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards in Motor-Vehicle Cases
Use of VSL amounts in conjunction with the probability of
detection has a strong theoretical foundation for establishing safety
incentives and would bring greater discipline to the setting of punitive
damages. It would provide a formal structure to what is currently an
untethered process. At present, jurors lack any specific methodology for
mapping their concerns with corporate behavior into a dollar punitive
damages amount. There have been just over one hundred blockbuster
punitive damages awards in the United States. Table 2 lists the eleven
punitive damages awards in excess of $100 million (i.e., blockbuster
punitive damages awards) that have been awarded to date in motorvehicle cases involving personal injury.1 64 Ten of these awards are
against major U.S. auto companies, and one is against the Bridgestone
and Firestone tire companies. The final column in Table 2 describes the
nature of the case and the alleged defect. Although there are some
exceptions involving several victims, most of these cases involve an
alleged product defect causing a single fatality. A punitive damages
award in the $100 million range could be warranted in such instances,
163. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(1) (2012) (requiring automobile manufacturers to disclose any
known defects relating to motor vehicle safety).
164. For a list of these cases and the award amounts, see infra Part IX tbl.2.
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provided that the jury believed the probability of detecting the wrongful
conduct is low. However, there is no evidence that this deterrence-based
logic has played any role in these awards. Plaintiff attorneys' requests
for punitive damages typically are based on irrelevant anchors that are
divorced from the task of establishing appropriate levels of
deterrence. 165
Five of the cases listed in Table 2 played a prominent role in the
discussion of the corporate risk analyses above. Thus, half of the
blockbuster award cases in which auto companies were defendants were
those in which a purported transgression of the company was that it
undertook a systematic risk analysis. Consequently, there has been a
diminished prominence of such risk analyses in later auto liability
cases, perhaps in part because companies have been severely
sanctioned for attempting to think systematically about the risk and
cost of vehicle design.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Risk analyses in which there is a systematic assessment of costs
and benefits can play a pivotal role in fostering efficient levels of safety.
Benefit-cost analyses using appropriate levels of the value of a
statistical life have played an increasingly prominent role in regulatory
policy and now guide the development of regulatory standards by
government agencies. In contrast, the role of corporate risk analyses
has diminished over time. Early efforts by companies to assess the risks
and costs associated with design choices appear to have been well
intentioned but were hindered by a systematic undervaluation of risks
to life and health. Valuations more in line with government agencies
would certainly have bolstered the credibility of the analyses and would
have led to different safety decisions in some instances. But
undertaking any analysis poses inherent problems of a company
becoming aware of the risks and costs and, in some instances, choosing
to not incur the costs to reduce the risks, both of which makes the
company vulnerable to punitive damages awards. Although a concerted
effort to educate jurors on the overall merits of systematic analysis of
the competing concerns may diminish the repercussions from

165. Company profits, sales, and advertising budgets are examples of company characteristics
that are less pertinent than the VSL. Even anchors with no stated rationale are influential. See
Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Do Plaintiffs'Requestsand Plaintiffs'Identities
Matter?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE, supra note 14, at 73 (conceptualizing the
decision to award punitive damages as an "anchor-and-insufficient-adjustment process" and
noting that "an arbitrary anchor value can sometimes exert a large influence on the final
judgment").
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undertaking a benefit-cost analysis, the role of hindsight bias will
continue to discourage prospective risk and cost assessments.
A potential solution to this problem would be the analog of a
regulatory compliance defense for regulatory analyses. If a company
undertakes an analysis consistent with the procedures used by the
pertinent regulatory agency, which would be NHTSA for auto safety,
and if the analysis indicates that the safety design feature is not
warranted, then these analyses should not be used against the company
in tort litigation. This risk analysis regime would also make the VSL
the cornerstone of safety decisions rather than compensatory damages
awards, which undervalue lives at risk.
Wholly apart from fostering more responsible corporate risk
analyses, the VSL could play a central role in reformulating the penalty
structure of current safety regulations. The limitations on the penalties
that NHTSA has imposed on company failures have resulted in
potential regulatory sanctions that are far below either the value of the
lives at risk or the costs to the company of addressing the defect. The
corporate strategy of suppressing information about safety defects and
failing to fix the defects should not become a profitable option simply
because government sanctions are better suited to promoting carefully
completed paperwork rather than disclosing fundamental product
risks. Pricing lives by integrating the VSL into corporate risk practices
and government regulatory efforts would produce more protective
safety policies.
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IX. APPENDIX

Table 1: Benefit-Cost Calculations for the Ford Pinto
PanelA: Benefit calculationsfor increasedsafety in Pintogas tank design
Ford's Unit Value
Ford's Total Value
Outcome of Faulty Design
180 burn deaths

$200,000

$36 million

180 serious burn injuries

$67,000

$12.1 million

2,100 burned vehicles

$700

$1.5 million
$49.6 million

Total

Panel B: Cost calculationsfor increased safety in Pinto gas tank design
Total Costa
Unit Cost
Number of Units
11 million cars

$11

$121 million

1.5 million light trucks

$11

$16.5 million

Total

$137.5 million

a Excluded is the minor cost component of the lost consumer's surplus of customers
who do not buy Pintos because of the $11 price increase.
Source: W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 112 (1991),
which in turn cites the internal 1973 Ford Motor Company document,
Memorandum, E. F. Grush & C. S. Saunby, Fatalities Associated with Crashhttp://www.autosafety.org/uploads/
Induced Fries
and Fuel Leakages,
phpq3mJ7FFordMemo.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7XFH-3KDG, discussed
in BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE

OFFENDERS 43-44 (1983).
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Table 2: Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards against
Automobile Con panies

Case

Year

State

Punitive
Damages
Amount
($ millions)

Punitive
Damages
Amount
($2012
millions)

Ford was aware of
design flaws with the
Pinto's fuel system
and fuel tank

Grimshaw
v. Ford
Motor Co.

1981

CA

125

Moseley v.
General
Motors

1993

GA

101

157.23

Hardy v.
General
Motors

1996

AL

100

143.36

1997

SC

250

350.38

Jimenez v.
Chrysler

Nature of
Plaintiffs Claim

309.33

placement. The rearend collision
punctured the Pinto's
tank, burning up the
vehicle and its
occupants.
GM placement of the
fuel tank outside the
vehicle frame of its
GMC Sierra truck.
GM analysis showed
that the design was
dangerous, leading to
a fire and the death
of a vehicle occupant
following a sideimpact collision.
Some GM door
latches were
substandard and
problematic
(according to
engineers' reports),
resulting in the
ejection of vehicle
occupants in a crash.
A defective rear
liftgate latch in a
1985 Chrysler
minivan resulted in
the opening of the
liftgate during a
rollover accident,
leading to the death
of a boy who was
ejected from the van.

PRICING LIVES

2015]

Punitive
Damages
Amount
($2012
millions)

Case

Year

State

Punitive
Damages
Amount
($ millions)

Robinson v.
Ford Motor
Co.

1998

MS

120

165.60

Romo v.
Ford Motor
Co.

1999

CA

290

391.56

Anderson v.
General
Motors

1999

CA

4,775

6,447.21

1161

Nature of
Plaintiffs Claim
A defective design in
a 1976 Ford Ranger
increased the risk of
a rollover during
turns, injuring two
people and killing
one.
During a rollover,
different components
of a Ford Bronco's
roof collapsed or
broke, killing three
people and injuring
two people.
The fuel tank in a
Chevrolet Malibu
exploded during a
collision, resulting in
severe burns to six

passengers.

White v.
Ford Motor
Co.

1999

NV

153.18

206.82

2000

MO

100

130.63

2002

AL

100

125.04

Dorman v.
Bridgestone
Firestone
Inc.

Jernigan v.
General
Motors

A parking break
failed to stop a Ford
F-350 truck from
rolling down a hill,
killing a boy when
the truck
inadvertently shifted
from first gear to
neutral.
A multi-piece tire
exploded while a man
was filling it with air,
seriously injuring
him.
A design defect in an
Oldsmobile 88
resulted in
inadequate protection
for the passenger
-compartment.
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Case
BuellWilson v.
Ford Motor
Co.

Year

State

Punitive
Damages
Amount
($ millions)

2004

CA

246

Punitive
Damages
Amount
($2012
millions)

292.94

[Vol. 68:4:1117

Nature of
Plaintiff's Claim
A Ford Explorer was
defectively unstable
and not crashworthy
because of a design
defect in the roof.

&

Source: All statistics are drawn from the database used in W. Kip Viscusi
Benjamin J. McMichael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution of Blockbuster
Punitive Damages Awards, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUDIES 350, 357 (2014). Almost all
of these cases are also listed in Alison F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing
Landscape of Blockbuster Punitive DamagesAwards, 12 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 116,
Appendix Tbl.A1 (2010).

